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Senior Associate, Dianne Caruso discusses whether the Court may vary final parenting Orders.
This section came into effect on 6 May 2024 and was intended to codify the established case law principle, commonly referred to as the rule in Rice & Asplund, per the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill. Recent case law considers whether the test imposed by s 65DAAA differs from the previous test applicable under the case law.
Section 65DAAA provides:
In the recent decision of Rasheem & Rasheem [2024] FedCFamC1F 595 the Court considered this provision and the extent to which it varies from the case law principle.
In regard to s 65DAAA, Altobelli J stated:
64. …The Court only needs to consider whether a significant change in circumstances has occurred. This is clearly a deviation from the rule in Rice and Asplund that mandated a finding of significant change in circumstances.
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66. For the purposes of s 65DAAA the Court must simply consider whether circumstances have significantly changed since the final parenting orders were made. The weight afforded to such change is varied, and necessarily based on the facts of the matter. The fundamental criteria that must be satisfied to allow a reconsideration of a final parenting order is that “the Court is satisfied that, in all the circumstances…it is in the best interests of the child for the final parenting order to be reconsidered” (s 65DAAA(1)(b)).
He cited the decision of Whitehill & Talaska [2024] FedCFamC2F 768 and stated:
68. The Court accepts Judge O’Shannessy’s proposition that, whilst it is mandatory to consider whether there has been a significant change of circumstances, such a change of circumstances is not a prerequisite to allow a reconsideration of a final parenting order under s 65DAAA of the Act. Other factors enunciated in s 65DAAA(2)(a)–(d) can inform the discharge of the statutory duty, especially if their evidentiary value outweighs the mere fact that significant change has not occurred.
He went on to state:
70. … Even the rejection of an application under this section requires the Court to consider s 60CC of the Act. This is addressed as the affirmative duty under s 65DAAA(1)(b) to not reconsider a final parenting order unless “it is in the best interests of the child for the final parenting order to be reconsidered”. This is an unfortunate step that is likely to increase the amount of potentially unnecessary litigation that children are exposed to. The underlying rationale for rejecting a Rice and Asplund application is unintentionally ignored by s 65DAAA. This renders the adjudicative process required under s 65DAAA different from that under the former rule in Rice and Asplund.
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72. Before the Court adjudicates, there is no method to determine whether an application under s 65DAAA is a parenting order, or not. Although semantic, it is important to maintain a distinction between orders of different natures. For example, a successful application under s 65DAAA is a parenting order, and it may therefore require the parties to attend mediation and to file a s 60I certificate. Alternatively, the dismissal of an application under s 65DAAA is not a parenting order, and these procedural requirements are unnecessary. Given that neither party can know whether the application will be successful or fail before judgment is delivered, arguably all parties are required to engage in these procedural hurdles. This will generate additional cost and delay if the s 65DAAA application is dismissed.
In summary, the Court highlighted differences between the previously applicable case law principle and that imposed by s 65DAAA including:
In the recent decision of Babic and Taccini [2024] FCWA 203, O’Brien J found that the distinction highlighted by Altobelli J regarding the Court no longer needing to be satisfied that a significant change of circumstances had occurred, although accurate, was “a distinction without a meaningful difference” (para. 17).
He went on to state:
18. Absent appellate intervention the starting presumption on the commencement of new parenting proceedings must be that the primary orders were correct – that is, that they were in the best interests of the children at the time they were made. That presumption is capable of rebuttal by cogent evidence that a material factor was not disclosed at the primary hearing; failing that, it must follow that it cannot be in the best interests of the children to discharge or vary those orders unless there has been a relevant change in circumstances since they were made.
19. In my view, notwithstanding that the authorities which established them predate the legislative amendment, the following principles remain intact:
It is important to ensure before making an application to the Court to vary final parenting Orders that the particular circumstances of the case satisfy the test which enables the Court to revisit those Orders. There can otherwise be consequences such as costs orders being made against the unsuccessful applicant.
If you require any advice regarding varying final parenting orders, please do not hesitate to contact HHG Legal Group, so one of our lawyers can assist with your enquiry
*The information provided in this website serves as a general guide and does not constitute legal advice. It is based on our research and experience at the time of publication. Please consult our knowledgeable legal team for any specific inquiries or advice relevant to your circumstances, as the content may not have been updated subsequently.
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